Answer to Same-City NCAA Sweet 16 Questions – Rental properties.

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Last week, we posed two questions regarding the NCAA basketball tournament: what are the odds that two teams from the same city would make the Sweet 16? And when was the last time that happened? To the first person to answer correctly, we offered some Freakonomics swag. And you responded, 147 of you to be exact.

Now it’s time to reveal the answers and the winners.

Let’s start with the easy one: When was the last time two teams from the same city advanced to the Sweet 16?

The correct answer is 2007, when USC and UCLA made it. The winner, bracket, responded in eight minutes, beating out Dimitri by just one minute.

Now onto the probability question.

Here’s how we worded it: The 64-team tournament this year started with three pairs of teams from the same city: U. of Richmond and VCU from Richmond; Vanderbilt and Belmont from Nashville; and Xavier and Cincinnati from Cincinnati. That’s 6 teams out of the original 64. So what are the odds that one of those pairs (U. of R., VCU) makes it to the Round of 16?

It’s a simple question, but the calculation’s tricky. In order to explain it, we turned to an expert, Columbia Business School statistics professor Nicolas Stier Moses, who helped us break down the problem into the basics of probability.

The calculation is based on the probability rules of “and,” “or,” and “not”. The simplest way to do the calculation is through Microsoft Excel using the COMBIN function to find the number of combinations that one can have when selecting k elements from n elements. This is used to find the number of ways that teams can advance to the next round. For example, you’ll find in all denominators combin(64,16), which represents the 16 teams that advance to the next round out of the 64 original ones.

Since the wording of the original question could have been interpreted as whether at least one pair advances, or that only one pair advances, we’ve provided both solutions:

At least one pair:


p(at least one team)
= p(1-2 or 3-4 or 5-6)
= p(1-2) + p(3-4) + p(5-6) – p(1-2, 3-4) – p(1-2, 5-6) – p(3-4,   5-6) + p(1-2, 3-4, 5-6)
= 3 p(1-2) – 3 p(1-2, 3-4) + p(1-2, 3-4, 5-6)
= 3  COMBIN(62,14)/COMBIN(64,16) – 3  COMBIN(60,12)/COMBIN(64,16) + COMBIN(58,10)/COMBIN(64,16)
= 3 * 0.0595 – 3 * 0.0028 + 0.0001 =
= 0.1701

Only one pair:

This is harder. You first have to determine the probability that any one given pair advances to the next round, not taking into account the other teams.

p(1-2)=p(1-2 alone)+p(1-2 and another)
=p(1-2 alone)+p(1-2, 3-4) + p(1-2, 5-6) – p(1-2, 3-4, 5-6)

It’s the same figure for all pairs if you take them one by one, but not the same as taking any of the three pairs. This is computed by setting that the pair advances, and from the remaining teams, 14 are to advance from the 62 that remain, hence combin(62,14).

p(1-2 alone)= p(1-2) – p(1-2, 3-4) – p(1-2, 5-6) + p(1-2, 3-4, 5-6)
= p(1-2) – 2 p(1-2, 3-4) + p(1-2, 3-4, 5-6)
= COMBIN(62,14)/COMBIN(64,16) – 2 COMBIN(60,12)/COMBIN(64,16) +COMBIN(58,10)/COMBIN(64,16)
= 0.0595 – 2 * 0.0029 + 0.0001
= 0.0539

From there, you can get the probability of exactly one pair advancing:

p(exactly one pair)
= p(1-2 alone)+ p(3-4 alone)+ p(5-6 alone)
= 3 p(1-2 alone)
= 0.1617

For this part of the contest, we’ve selected two winners.  Reader Michael Lugo was the first to answer the question correctly, and in fact went above and beyond the call of duty, accounting for an additional layer of complexity — the fact that “we can’t have both Nashville teams and both Richmond teams making it to the Sweet 16, since Vanderbilt and Richmond competed for the same slot.”  But we’ll also be awarding swag to reader MW, who exactly matched our answer.

Congratulations to bracket, Michael Lugo, and MW, and thanks to everyone for playing!

How Is a Colonoscopy Like a Boring Soccer Match – Rental houses.

Photo: Thomas Northcut

A reader named Florian Kern writes from Germany:

I was listening the other day to your very interesting podcast on memory and pain. Yesterday, then, I watched the incredibly boring soccer game between Germany and Kazakhstan. This is where I realized that soccer is a bit like the study you were discussing in your podcast on the decisive last five painful minutes in colonoscopies: while Germany shot three goals in the first half, the second half was so bad that people started to boo and continued untiiiiiiiillll….. Germany scored in the last minute, and everybody was happy ;-) .

Tiger Woods Kicked Out of Principles of Economics : Regina rental properties.

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The newest version of the widely used Principles of Economics textbook will run without a Tiger Woods reference: “Previous editions of the textbook used an example entitled, ‘Should Tiger Woods Mow His Own Lawn?’ The sixth edition of the book replaced the previous example with one featuring quarterback Tom Brady…”  ”From my perspective, this was a relatively small change,” explains Greg Mankiw, the textbook’s author.  ”Why did I make it? I wanted students to focus on the economics of comparative advantage—the main point of this section of the book. I was afraid that keeping Tiger Woods in the hypothetical example would have raised thoughts of an altogether different set of issues.” (HT: Collin Campbell)

This Is What I Call Being Risk-Averse | Rental properties edenvale.

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I found myself in a Las Vegas sports book with good friend and economist John List the other day.  Since we both live in Chicago and have kids who play baseball, we thought it would be fun to bet some money on the Chicago White Sox.  It would give us a reason to root for the White Sox, and give our kids a reason to open up the morning paper to see if the team had won.

We have no special information about the White Sox, no inside information.  It was purely for consumption value.

If the sports book would give us a fair bet, i.e. the equivalent of a 50-50 coin toss, we would be willing to bet a lot because we aren’t very risk averse.  I’d say we would have been willing to bet at least $10,000, probably even more.

But, of course, the sports book doesn’t offer fair bets.  On the particular bet we were looking at — how many games the White Sox would win over the course of the regular season – the sports book charges about an 8 percent vigorish or commission.  We decided that at that price, we were willing to bet $2,500.  Eight percent of $2,500 is $200, so essentially we were willing to pay the sports book $200 in expectation to let us place this bet.

So we strolled up to the betting window and said we wanted $2,500 on the White Sox to win more than 84.5 games this year.

The lady behind the counter said the biggest bet we could make was $300.

What?!

We asked her why, and she called over a manager who told us the reason: The casino “didn’t want to take too much risk on this kind of bet.”

This casino is part of Caesars Entertainment, the largest casino company in the world, with annual revenues approaching $10 billion.  And they aren’t willing to let us pay them $200 to flip a coin for $2,500?

The next thing you know, the casino will tell me I can’t lay $2,500 on “Black” at the roulette table.  After all, it is essentially the same gamble as our White Sox bet … a coin toss in which the casino gets better than fair odds.

This seems like a crazy way to run a business.  It is especially surprising because Caesars is one of the few big businesses run by an economist, Gary Loveman, who has brought good economic thinking to many other aspects of the company’s operations.

If I weren’t an economist, running a sports book would be a pretty good job. I wonder if Caesars is accepting resumes?

(For more on sports betting at Caesars and in general, see this column we wrote for The New York Times a few years back.)

Let Teams Choose Their NCAA Bracket Position :- Rental properties.

Nate Silver has (another) truly insightful post demonstrating the possible perverse advantage of receiving an 11th seed instead of an 8th seed in the NCAA tournament.

He explains:

[An average] team like Arizona would have a considerably better chance — about two-and-a-half times better, in fact — of winning its second round game and advancing to the Round of 16 as a No. 12 seed than as a No. 8 or No. 9 seed. This, of course, is because it has not yet had to face the No. 1 seed.

He also understands why this is a problem:

I think you need to be concerned any time you create an incentive for losing — which is what the current tournament structure does. For example, a team playing in a conference championship that figured to be a No. 9 seed if it won the tournament but a No. 11 seed if it lost might have some incentive to tank.

But when it comes to solutions, he misses an obvious one (which is somewhat inspired by Scorecasting’s suggestion that NFL coaches bid for possession in overtime).  The NCAA could rank the 16 teams in a bracket  from best to worst as it does now — but then allow the teams (starting with the number one seed) to choose which bracket position they would want to occupy.   The first and second ranked teams would almost certainly choose different halves of the bracket.  The 15th and 16th ranked teams would almost certainly still have to play the top ranked teams (because no other bracket positions would be left).  But we would quickly see whether the 8th ranked team would follow the Silver reasoning and opt for what is now the 12th ranked bracket position to increase its chance of surviving to the Sweet Sixteen.

Silver prefers a solution where the NCAA ranks only the top 6 teams, and the rest of the bracket position are determined by lot.  He envisions a tournament selection show “expanded from one hour to two, with the last half involving Vanna White and Dean Smith drawing ping-pong balls out of a tumbler.”  But I’d prefer for the second hour of the show to be having coaches on the clock choosing in succession their bracket position.  Creating an additional strategic decision might be even more fun than drawing ping-pong balls.